EUPillar C-456/11 Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung AG and Others v Samskip GmbH (Third Chamber)

Summary

This case on Arts 32 and 33 involved four German insurance companies and Krones AG (a German company insured by them), against Samskip (a German subsidiary of Samskip Holding BV, an undertaking founded in Iceland and established in the Netherlands), concerning the delivery by Samskip of a brewing installation to a purchaser, Cerveceria Cuauthemoc Monezum (‘the recipient’), a Mexican undertaking. The dispute involved an action for compensation brought before the referring court in Germany by the claimants concerning damage allegedly caused to that installation during transport. The Belgian courts had dismissed as inadmissible similar actions brought before them on the ground that the bill of lading, drawn up when Samskip took delivery of the installation in Belgium, contained an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of Icelandic courts. The referring court observed that, in Samskip’s submission, the actions were inadmissible inasmuch as the Belgian judgment produced legal effects not only as regards the Belgian courts’ lack of jurisdiction but also as regards the finding that jurisdiction lies with the Icelandic courts, as stated in the grounds of that judgment. Samskip states that that judgment has binding effect on the referring court in accordance with Arts 32 and 33 of Brussels I. The claimants argued that, at most, binding effect extended to that part of the Belgian judgment on the lack of jurisdiction but not any further. The referring court was unsure whether it was bound to recognise the Belgian judgment and, if so, whether the scope of such recognition extended to the reasons for the judgment contained therein as well. It referred some questions to the CJEU. By its first and second questions, the referring court asked whether Art 32 also covers a judgment by which a court of a MS declines jurisdiction on the basis of a jurisdiction clause, even though that judgment is classified as a ‘procedural judgment’ by the law of another MS. In examining these questions, the CJEU considered the wording of Art 32 and the objectives set out in Recitals 2 (“simple” recognition), 6 (“free movement of judgments”), 16 and 17 (“mutual trust”) to Brussels I. It observed that a restrictive interpretation of the concept of judgment would give rise to a category of judicial decisions which are not among the exhaustively-listed exceptions set out in Arts 34 and 35 which could not be categorised as ‘judgments’ for the purposes of Art 32 and which the courts of other MS would accordingly not be obliged to recognise. It found that such a category of decisions would be incompatible with the system established by Arts 33 to 35. Agreeing with AG Bot, it held that Art 32 also covers a judgment by which the court of a MS declines jurisdiction on the basis of a jurisdiction clause, irrespective of how that judgment is categorised under the law of another MS. The third question was whether under Arts 32 and 33 the court before which recognition is sought of a judgment by which a court of another MS has declined jurisdiction on the basis of a jurisdiction clause is bound by the finding- made in the grounds of a judgment, which has since become final, declaring the action inadmissible- regarding the validity of that clause. Considering the Jenard Report, its interpretation in 145/86 Hoffmann, and the concept of res judicata under EU law, it found that a judgment by which a court of a MS has declined jurisdiction on the basis of a jurisdiction clause, on the ground that that clause is valid, binds the courts of the other MSs both as regards that court’s decision to decline jurisdiction, contained in the operative part of the judgment, and as regards the finding on the validity of that clause, contained in the ratio decidendi which provides the necessary underpinning for that operative part. The CJEU created a uniform definition of res judicata which extends even to judgments given by EU national courts under unharmonised rules of jurisdiction.