PIL instrument(s)
Brussels I
Case number and/or case name
OLG Hamburg, 14.4.2004 – 13 U 76/03
Details of the court
Germany, Second Instance
Articles referred to by the court
Brussels I
Article 15
Paragraph 1 SubParagraph a
Paragraph 1 SubParagraph b
Paragraph 1 SubParagraph c
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 3
Article 17
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 3
Article 18
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 2
Article 19
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 2 SubParagraph a
Paragraph 2 SubParagraph b
Article 21
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 2
Article 23
Paragraph 1 SubParagraph a
Paragraph 1 SubParagraph b
Paragraph 1 SubParagraph c
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 5
Date of the judgement
13 April 2004
Appeal history
None
CJEU's case law cited by the court
Summary
The parties argued about claims from a commercial agent contract. The contract contained a forum clause that had been inserted by general terms and conditions. The forum clause stated the international jurisdiction of French courts. The first instance court denied the international jurisdiction of German courts. The Higher Regional Court affirmed the first instance court’s judgment. It held that an agreement with a German commercial agent stated in general terms and conditions that established an exclusive place of jurisdiction in a foreign state (here: France) wasn’t contrary to Art. 19, 21, 15, or 17 Brussels I applied by analogy. It was correct to deny the application of Art. 19, 21, 15 and 17 Brussels I to the present case. The rules regarding employees and consumers aim to protect them in terms of cross-border disputes within the EU. These rules imply that the protected party has a weaker position in the litigation (see Recitals 13, 14 Brussels I). It can however not be assumed that commercial agents in general have a similar position as consumers and employees do. The commercial agent wasn’t bound by instructions nor has there been a significant need for protection. There were indications for a similar position as consumers or employees have it. A different interpretation would have extended the Regulation’s wording to a measure that would have made it necessary to initiate preliminary proceedings. The judgment is correct.

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