EUPillar C-412/10 Deo Antoine Homawoo v GMF Assurances SA [2011] ECR I-11603 (Fourth Chamber)

Summary

The case concerns the interpretation of Arts 31 and 32 of Rome II, in combination with Article 297 TFEU. It was referred to the CJEU in English proceedings between Mr Homawoo, a UK domiciliary sustained a road traffic accident during his stay in France, and GMF Assurances SA, an insurance company incorporated and established in France. The driver of the vehicle which caused the accident on 29 August 2007 was insured by GMF. Mr Homawoo brought proceedings for personal injury and indirect damages before the English High Court against, in particular, GMF on 8 January 2009. He claimed that the assessment of the amount of damages is to be determined by the conflict-of-law rules applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings. It was therefore governed by English law under English private international law since Rome II was not applicable ratione temporis on the ground that it does not apply to events giving rise to damage which occur before 11 January 2009, as the date set for its entry into force, according to Arts 31 and 32. In the alternative, he submitted that Rome II does not apply where the relevant proceedings were commenced prior to that date, irrespective of the date on which the damage occurred. GMF did not dispute that Mr Homawoo’s claim for compensation was well founded, but it claimed that the assessment of damages is to be determined by the conflict-of-law rules in Rome II and therefore by French law on the ground that Rome II entered into force on the 20th day following its publication in the OJ, according to Art 297 TFEU and therefore it is applicable to the dispute as the event giving rise to damage occurred after that date and as the national court was called on to determine the applicable law after 11 January 2009. The court took the view that there is nothing to warrant interpreting Art 32 of Rome II as meaning that the Regulation is applicable to all proceedings brought subsequent to the date therein. Rather applying the Regulation only to events giving rise to damage occurring after 11 January 2009 would ensure legal certainty by achieving a fixed date, irrespective of different litigation procedures. However, in the light of the wording of Art 31 of Rome II, it decided to refer three questions to the CJEU concerning the scope ratione temporis of Rome II. As regards the date of entry into force of the Regulation, the CJEU decided that since there is no specific provision in Rome II that sets the date for its entry into force, that date must be determined in accordance with the general rule in Art 297(1)(3) of the TFEU which results that it entered into force on the 20th day following that of its publication, ie on 20 August 2007. The CJEU further decided that Art 31, which states that the Regulation applies to events giving rise to damage which occur after its entry into force, is to be interpreted by taking account of the date given in Art 32, ie 11 January 2009, except for Article 29 and held that Art 31 applies to events giving rise to damage occurring after that date. Thus, it is the only time to be considered by the national courts in determining the scope ratione temporis of Rome. The CJEU arrived at this result by interpreting Rome II in the light of its recitals (6, 13, 14 and 16) and its objective (predictability, legal certainty and uniform application). The CJEU ruled that on the basis of Arts 31 and 32 of Rome II, read in conjunction with Art 297 TFEU, the Regulation applies only to events giving rise to damage occurring after 11 January 2009 and that the date on which the proceedings seeking compensation for damage were brought or the date on which the applicable law was determined by the court seised have no bearing on determining the scope ratione temporis of the Regulation. This was an excellent decision by the CJEU.