EUPillar Pears Plastics NV v. Maryse Megel IKV - AR 03/211

Summary

By its decision of 5 February 2003, the Court had reopened the debates. The issue is whether the place in a member state where, under the contract, the goods were delivered or should have been delivered, as mentioned in Art. 5(1)(b) Brussels I Regulation, must be conceived as the final place of delivery of the goods or as the place where the goods legally had to be delivered, under the law of obligations. The Court believes it is the latter, since: this complies with a literal interpretation of the text of the Article; the factual interpretation appears in almost no legal literature; the final place of delivery is an uncertain criterion; “delivery” is a term with a universal legal meaning, i.e. “the placing of the goods at the buyer's disposal by the seller” (see e.g. Art. 31 CISG) Art. 63 Brussels I Regulation mentions the final place of delivery of the goods; if Art. 5(1)(b) alluded to the “final place of delivery of the goods”, the words “final place of delivery” would have been used; the final place of delivery of the goods is often the place of business of the buyer, in that case Art. 5(1)(b) is no real alternative for Art. 2 Brussels I Regulation. In those circumstances, under the contract the goods are delivered in Belgium (FCA Houthalen). The obligation in question should be performed in Belgium and the Belgian courts have international jurisdiction. It is not necessary to examine whether the parties agreed “otherwise” on the place of payment, since the claimant mentioned his Belgian bank on the front side of the invoice and this would not lead to a the jurisdiction of a different Member State. Short critique: the Court correctly interprets the place of delivery as a factual criterion. The court should not have mentioned the place of payment, since the parties cannot derogate from Art. 5(1)(b) by agreeing on a different place of payment.