Summary
The parties married in 2006 in Las Vegas. They lived in Spain.
In August 2009, the parties separated. The wife returned to England.
On 29th March 2010, the wife commenced divorce proceedings in England.
On 23rd September 2010, the parties entered into an agreement. According to its terms, the wife had to abandon the English proceedings, committing to take part in divorce proceedings in Spain.
On 13th December 2010, the parties filed for a divorce by mutual agreement in Spain. However, these proceedings were subsequently closed as the wife failed to sign the agreement.
On 30th November 2011, the husband requested a stay of the English proceedings relying on the parties’ agreement which was dated 23rd September 2010.
On 2nd April 2012, HH Judge Booth granted the husband’s request, noting that the parties’ agreement was a significant factor in this case.
It appeared that, on 11th April 2012, a second divorce petition appeared to be filed by the wife. On 13th March 2013, HH Judge Booth stayed this set of proceedings.
On 28th May 2013, the wife filed a notice of appeal against the judgment rendered by HH Judge Booth on 2nd April 2012. The wife’s appeal was allowed by the Court of Appeal. Lord Vos held:
“39 The judge's holding that the effect of the Agreement was to estop the wife from arguing that the English divorce proceedings remained extant had precisely the same effect as if he had expressly enforced an agreement as to jurisdiction. Article 19 inhibits any such process. In my judgment, therefore, the judge was wrong to order a stay of the proceedings on the basis of the Agreement. He ought to have held that the provisions of article 19 of the Council Regulation were applicable and could not be overridden by the Agreement.
40 In the Agreement, the wife undertook that upon signature she would prove that she had abandoned the English divorce proceedings. This was something she had not done at the time, and in fact never did. She was not estopped from arguing that the English divorce proceedings remained in existence, but she could easily have withdrawn those proceedings. Since she did not do so, the judge was wrong, in my judgment, to stay or dismiss them.” [39-40]