The proceedings were in respect of two children, J and B.
The father wanted to enforce a contact order, made by DG Bowman.
The parties to proceedings met in Spain in 2004. The father was British; the mother was American. Their first child was born in Spain in 2008. They got married in Gibraltar in 2010. Their second child was born in 2012.
In November 2012, they came to England. However, they separated in 2013 and the mother and the children went back to Spain.
It was agreed that the children were to remain with the mother; the father was going to have contact.
The order was dated 2nd December 2013. In this context, the English court had to consider whether the children were habitually resident in England. Mr Justice Peter Jackson held:
“34 […] I find that the reality for the children is that they have reintegrated into their social and family environment in Spain. Even though the order shows that their presence in Spain was not intended to be permanent, it had the necessary quality of stability at the time this court became seised. The children are dependant on their mother and both she and they have have a significant history of living in Spain. The factual enquiry I have conducted takes account of the intentions of the parents and the court that are reflected in the 2013 order, but I find that while these carry significant weight, they are outweighted by the circumstances of the children's actual situation as habitual residents of Spain.
35 I further find that there has not been a prorogation to this court of jurisdiction in this matter. The mother has not in my view done anything that amounts to an acceptance within the meaning of Article 12 . Her participation in divorce proceedings does not amount to that (see Bush v Bush [2008] EWCA Civ 865 paras. 12, 53 and 32). Nor in the overall circumstances do I find that it would be in the superior interests of these children for the court to accept a prorogation of jurisdiction when they are not habitually resident here.
36 I therefore find that in November 2014 and since then the children are not habitually resident in England and Wales and that this court has no general jurisdiction in respect of them.” [34-36]