Summary
The case was concerned with an investment fraud. The claimants, who were the victims, of the fraud obtained a worldwide freezing injunction in May 2006. Although the substantive claim was litigated in Italy, the English court held that jurisdiction against the defendant could be exercised under Art 25 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 which gave effect to Article 31 of Brussels I. Contrary to the worldwide freezing injunction, the parents helped the defendant to make some corporate transfers and dissipation of assets.
The claimants sought an injunction against the parents. They obtained permission to amend the claim form and served it to the parents out of jurisdiction.
The order made by Andrew Smith judge was challenged before the High Court.
On 24th September 2009, the English High Court held that Mr Justice Smith’s order, dated 8th May 2009, must be set aside. In this context, Mr Justice Flaux held:
“58 […] in my judgment, these two related considerations, the absence of any connection between the parents and the jurisdiction and the impracticality of enforcing the order against them, make it inexpedient to make the order. However, the matter does not rest there. As the passage from the judgment of Walker J quoted above demonstrates, in cases where the European jurisprudence (i.e. Van Uden) does apply, the claimant must also satisfy the criterion in that case of a real connecting link between the subject matter of the measures sought and the territorial jurisdiction of the English court. Whether the subject matter of the measures sought is the assets sought to be frozen or the defendant against whom an order is sought or both, that criterion simply cannot be satisfied here. The assets are in Monaco, the parents are in Italy and there is no real connecting link at all. The connection of the first defendant with the jurisdiction cannot provide the necessary link where the position of each defendant has to be considered separately.
59 It follows that in my judgment it was not expedient to make an order against the parents under section 25 of the 1982 Act and permission to serve out pursuant to paragraph 3.1(5) of Practice Direction B to CPR Part 6 should not have been granted. Since, for the reasons I have given earlier in this judgment, there is no other basis upon which permission could be granted, it must follow that the order of Andrew Smith J of 8 May 2009 must be set aside in its entirety.” [58-59]