PIL instrument(s)
Brussels I
Case number and/or case name
JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov & Ors [2012] EWHC 2698 (Comm)
Details of the court
England and Wales, First Instance
Articles referred to by the court
Brussels I
Article 22
Paragraph 2
Date of the judgement
08 October 2012
Appeal history
None
CJEU's case law cited by the court
None
Summary
This was an application for the court to appoint David Rubin of David Rubin & Partners as receiver of Usarel for the purposes of defending the claim brought by the bank against Usarel. The application was made on 1st October, and was dealt with in a haste before the hearing. The court proceedings were in relation to a very large scale fraud. In the fraud claim, JSC BTA Bank is suing Mr Ablyazov and some other defendants, including the applicant, Usarel. Usarel was incorporated in Cyprus. The Bank challenged the English court's jurisdiction to appoint a receiver on the ground of Article 22 of Brussels I. The English court dismissed the challenge, exercising jurisdiction under the English common law. It was held: “21 The matter is comparable to the bank’s application made earlier in these proceedings for the appointment of a receiver, and later manager, of Mr Ablyazov’s assets for the purpose of making a freezing order more effective. It was not, so far as I am aware, suggested by anyone that art.22(2) prevented the court from having jurisdiction to appoint a receiver and manager of Mr Ablyazov’s assets on the grounds that the application to appoint a receiver and manager amounted to proceedings the object of which was the validity of prospective decisions to be taken by an organ of the foreign companies in question, namely, the receiver and manager. The reason why that was not suggested, as I understood Mr Smith to accept, was that the application to appoint a receiver and manager did not amount to “proceedings” within art.22(2) but was merely an application within the underlying proceedings in which the bank claimed damages and other remedies against the defendants for fraud. Those proceedings were not proceedings the object of which was the validity of decisions of organs of those companies. Essentially for the same reasons I do not consider that the application in this case amounts to “proceedings” within art.22(2).” [21].

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