EUPillar Joined cases Sophia Marie Nicole Sanders v David Verhaegen (C-400/13) and Barbara Huber v Manfred Huber (C-408/13) (Third Chamber)

Summary

Sander’s case (C-400/13) is a child maintenance claim brought before the applicant’s local court for her place of residence (the Amtsgerich Mettman) against a debtor resident in Belgium. The court referred the case to the Amtsgericht Düsseldorf, in accordance with Para 28(1) of the Law on the Recovery of Maintenance in Relations with Foreign States (Auslandsunterhaltsgesetz) of 23 May 2011 (BGBl. 2011 I, p. 898; ‘the AUG’), ‘[i]f a party concerned does not have his or her habitual residence in Germany, the court which is to rule exclusively on applications in maintenance cases falling under Article 3(a) and (b) of Regulation … No 4/2009 is the Amtsgericht [Local Court] which has jurisdiction for the seat of the Oberlandesgericht [Higher Regional Court] in whose area of jurisdiction the defendant or creditor has his or her habitual residence.’ The Amtsgericht Düsseldorf was, however, of the view that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case as, pursuant to Article 3(b) of the Maintenance Regulation, jurisdiction lay with the court for the place, in a Member State, where the applicant was habitually resident (i.e. the Amtsgericht Mettmann). The Amtsgericht Düsseldorf therefore stayed the proceedings and referred the following question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling: ‘Is Para 28(1) of [the AUG] contrary to Art 3(a) and (b) of [the Maintenance Regulation]?’ Huber’s case (C-408/13) is a child maintenance claim brought before the applicant’s local court for her place of residence (the Amtsgericht Kehl) against a debtor resident in Barbados. The court referred the case to the Amtsgericht Karlsruhe, in accordance with Para 28(1) of the AUG. The Amtsgericht Karlsruhe was, however, of the view that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case as, pursuant to Art 3(b) of the Maintenance Regulation, jurisdiction lay with the court for the place, in a Member State, where the applicant was habitually resident (i.e. the Amtsgericht Kehl). The Amtsgericht Karlsruhe therefore stayed the proceedings and referred a similar question to the CJEU as the Amtsgericht Düsseldorf. The CJEU joined the cases and considered Art 3(b) as only this provision was relevant to the present case, i.e. the legal proceedings were brought against the debtor by the maintenance creditor before the court for the creditor’s place of habitual residence. The CJEU noted that Art 3(b) which conferred jurisdiction on ‘the place where the creditor is habitually resident’, determined both international and territorial jurisdiction. Consequently, the correct interpretation of Art 3(b) is that it precludes national legislation which establishes a centralisation of judicial jurisdiction in matters relating to cross-border maintenance obligations in favour of a first instance court which has jurisdiction for the seat of the appeal court. The only exception is where that rule helps to attain the objective of a proper administration of justice and protects the interests of maintenance creditors while promoting the effective recovery of such claims. It is for the referring court to verify whether the exception applies. The guidance provided by the CJEU in the present decision appears to be rather vague. Indeed, there remains a significant scope for subjective considerations as to whether the exception of ‘achieving the objective of a proper administration of justice and protecting the interests of maintenance creditors while promoting the effective recovery of such claims’ applies. The will of the German legislature should be respected by the courts because ‘specialisation’ brought about by ‘concentration’ of jurisdiction is a good thing in international family law. The distance for maintenance creditors to travel in Germany is well within the discretion of the national legislature in determining the geographical area in which a person is habitually resident.