Referring court and Member State
Bulgaria, Second Instance, Sofiyski gradski sad
Summary
This case on the interpretation of Art 22(1) of Brussels I was referred to the CJEU in non-contentious proceedings brought by Mr Schneider (a Hungarian national placed under guardianship pursuant to Hungarian legislation) for authorisation to sell his share of a property situated in Bulgaria. Pursuant to Hungarian legislation, a Hungarian court placed Mr Schneider under guardianship and, for those purposes, appointed as legal representative and official guardian for him a person who is also a Hungarian national. Mr Schneider and his brother inherited from their mother half-shares in an apartment in Bulgaria. Acting with the approval of his guardian, Mr Schneider applied to the Sofia District Court for authorisation to sell his share of that property by claiming that the sale would help him to meet his individual needs in Hungary, in particular, the costs of constant healthcare and accommodation in a healthcare establishment. This application was refused on the ground that disposal of the property was not in the interests of a person declared to be lacking full legal capacity and that his interests would be adversely affected if his immovable property were to be sold and the money thus obtained put into a trust fund, leaving him homeless in Hungary. Mr Schneider had appealed against the decision before the referring court which asked the CJEU whether Art 22(1) of Brussels I can be applied to non-contentious proceedings. The CJEU firstly stressed that Brussels I applies in civil and commercial matters’, but not to ‘the status or legal capacity of natural persons’ under Art 1. The CJEU cited its case-law on Art 16(1)(a) of the Brussels Convention which it found also applicable in construing Art 22(1) of Brussels I according to Recital 19. The CJEU particularly cited C 115/88 Reichert and Kockler and C-343/04 ČEZ where it found that, under Art 16(1)(a) of the Convention, “the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the Contracting State in which the property is situated does not encompass all actions concerning rights in rem in immovable property, but only those which both come within the scope of the convention and are actions which seek to determine the extent, content, ownership or possession of immovable property or the existence of other rights in rem therein and to provide the holders of those rights with protection for the powers which attach to their interest”. It accordingly observed that the sole aim of the main proceedings was to determine whether it is in the interests Mr Schneider who lacks full legal capacity to dispose of his immovable property and that his rights in rem as owner of that property are not being called in question. The CJEU found that this question does not fall within the scope of Brussels I because it is directly linked to the legal capacity of the natural person under Art 1(2)(a). The CJEU also referred to the Jenard Report which supported this way of interpretation. This was a straightforward case in which the CJEU gave a correct interpretation in a reasonably short period of time, ie 13 months.