PIL instrument(s)
Brussels I
Case number and/or case name
C-616/10 Solvay SA v Honeywell Fluorine Products Europe BV and Others (Third Chamber)
Parties
Solvay SA v Honeywell Fluorine Products Europe BV and Others
Referring court and Member State
Netherlands, First Instance, Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage
Articles referred to by the CJEU
Brussels I
Article 2
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 2
Article 6
Paragraph 1
Article 22
Paragraph 4
Article 25
Article 31
Date of the judgement
12 July 2012
Summary
This case on the interpretation of Arts 6(1), 22(4) and 31 of Brussels I was referred to the CJEU in proceedings between (i) Solvay (established in Belgium) and (ii) Honeywell Fluorine (established in the Netherlands) and Honeywell Belgium and Honeywell Europe (both established in Belgium), together ‘the Honeywell companies’, regarding the alleged infringement by various parties of a European patent. Solvay, the proprietor of a European patent, brought an action before the referring court in the Netherlands for infringement of the national parts of that patent against the defendants by virtue of their performance of reserved actions with regard to the same product. It also lodged an interim claim against the Honeywell companies, seeking provisional relief in the form of a cross-border prohibition against infringement until a decision had been made in the main proceedings. In the interim proceedings, the Honeywell companies raised the defence of invalidity of the national parts of the patent, but they did not bring or even declare their intention of bringing proceedings for the annulment of the national parts of that patent, and they did not contest the jurisdiction of the Dutch courts. The referring court asked six questions to the CJEU. The first question was on the applicability of Art 6(1). Taking account of Recitals 11, 12 and 15, and also citing C 145/10 Painer, the CJEU affirmed that the purpose of Art 6(1) is to avoid irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings and that, as a special jurisdiction rule, it must be strictly interpreted. Referring to C 539/03 Roche and agreeing with AG Cruz Villalón, the CJEU observed that, due to specific features of the present case, the potential divergences in the outcome of the proceedings are likely to arise in the same situation of fact and law. The reason being that each court will have to examine the alleged infringements under different national legislation governing the various national parts of the European patent alleged to have been infringed and it is possible that they will culminate in irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings. It found that where two or more companies established in different MSs, in proceedings pending before a court of one of those MSs, are each separately accused of committing an infringement of the same national part of a European patent which is in force in yet another MS by virtue of their performance of reserved actions with regard to the same product, is capable of leading to ‘irreconcilable judgments’ resulting from separate proceedings as referred to under Art 6(1). The CJEU further found that it is for the referring court to assess whether such a risk exists, taking into account all the relevant information in the file. The second question was on the applicability of 22(4). The CJEU rephrased the question and analysed whether Art 22(4) precludes the application of Art 31. It underlined that Arts 22(4) and 31 regulate different situations, they have a distinct field of application and they do not refer to each other. It explained that Art 22(4) concerns the attribution of jurisdiction to rule on the substance in proceedings relating to a clearly defined area whereas Art 31 is designed to apply regardless of any jurisdiction as to the substance. It thus found that Art 31 is independent in scope from Art 22(4), but nonetheless it examined whether the CJEU case law on Art 16(4) of the Brussels Convention leads to a different conclusion. It, in particular, considered C 4/03 GAT where it interpreted Art 16(4) of the Brussels Convention widely in order to ensure its effectiveness. It found that the reasons which led it to interpret widely the jurisdiction under Art 22(4) of Brussels I do not require the disapplication of Art 31 in the present case. It accordingly confirmed that Art 22(4) does not preclude the application of Art 31 and based on this there was no need to answer the remaining questions.

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