Referring court and Member State
Czech Republic, Third Instance, Nejvyšší soud
Summary
This case on Art 66(2) of Brussels I was referred to the CJEU in proceedings between Wolf Naturprodukte (a company established in Austria), and SEWAR (a company established in the Czech Republic), concerning the recognition and enforcement in the Czech Republic of a judgment delivered in Austria. In 2003, an Austrian court had ordered SEWAR to pay a claim brought against by it by Wolf Naturprodukte which then applied in 2007 to the Czech courts for that judgment to be declared enforceable, under Brussels I, in the Czech Republic and inter alia for assets of SEWAR to be ordered to be seized for that purpose. The court dismissed the application on the ground that Brussels I was binding on the Czech Republic only from its accession to the EU, ie 1 May 2004. This judgment was confirmed on appeal. During the appeal on a point of law, the referring court considered that the temporal scope of Brussels I under Art 66 was not clear and asked the CJEU whether, for the application of Brussels I to the recognition and enforcement of a judgment, it is necessary under Art 66(2) that Brussels I was in force both in the MS of origin and in the MS addressed at the time of delivery of that judgment. The CJEU agreed with AG Cruz Villalón that Brussels I entered into force on 1 March 2002, in accordance with Art 76, however, in the territory of States which, like the Czech Republic acceded to the EU on 1 May 2004, it entered into force only on that date. The CJEU observed that Art 66(1) or (2) does not specify whether the concept of the ‘entry into force’ refers to the entry into force of Brussels I in the State of origin, or in the State addressed. In interpreting the concept, the CJEU considered the close link between the rules on jurisdiction and the rules on the recognition and enforcement of judgments in Brussels I, which proposes that only judg¬ments deliv¬ered in accor¬dance with the juris¬dic¬tional rules of Brussels I will be enforced under it. After considering its judgments in Opinion 1/03 and in 125/79 Denilauler and taking account of the Jenard Report, the CJEU observed that the application of the simplified recognition and enforcement rules of Brussels I, which protect the claimant especially by enabling him to obtain the swift, certain and effective enforcement of the judgment delivered in his favour in the MS of origin, is justified only to the extent that the judgment which is to be recognised or enforced was delivered in accordance with the jurisdiction rules therein. These rules protect the interests of the defendant, in particular by the special jurisdiction rules in Arts 5 to 7. It also observed that Brussels I contains certain mechanisms, eg Art 26(1) and (2), which protect the defendant’s rights during the original proceedings in the State of origin, but which apply only if the defendant is domiciled in a MS. It concluded that, in the light of the history and the scheme and purpose of Art 66, the concept of ‘entry into force’ must be understood as the date from which Brussels I applies in both the MSs concerned. It held that for the application of Brussels I to the recognition and enforcement of a judgment, it is necessary that at the time of delivery of that judgment Brussels I was in force both in the MS of origin and in the MS addressed.