EUPillar C-139/10 Prism Investments BV v Jaap Anne van der Meer (Fourth Chamber) [2011] ECR I-09511

Summary

This case on Art 45(1) of Brussels I was referred to the CJEU in proceedings between Prism Investments (a company governed by Netherlands law) and Mr van der Meer, in his capacity as receiver in the liquidation of Arilco Holland, the Netherlands subsidiary of Arilco Opportune (a company governed by Belgian law), concerning enforcement in the Netherlands of a Belgian court decision ordering payment of a sum of money. A Finnish bank had made a loan to Arilco Opportune which lent that sum to Arilco Holland. Arilco Holland then transferred the funds to several companies, including Prism Investments. A Belgian court ordered Arilco Opportune to pay to LSP the sum lent. During the appeal, Arilco Holland brought a cross appeal seeking an order that Prism Investments should reimburse to it the sum that Prism Investments had received. This request was granted. In the Netherlands, Arilco Holland was declared insolvent and Mr van der Meer was appointed as the receiver. He applied to the Dutch courts, under Art 38 of Brussels I, for the Belgian court’s judgment to be declared enforceable. That application was granted so Prism Investments brought, under Art 43 of Brussels I, an action for annulment of that order for enforcement in the Netherlands. It maintained that the Belgian judgment had already been complied with in Belgium by means of a financial settlement. This application was dismissed on the ground that under Art 45(1), a declaration of enforceability can be revoked only on one of the grounds specified in Arts 34 and 35, and that compliance with the obligations in question did not come within any of those grounds and could not therefore be taken into account for the purposes of an appeal against the declaration of enforceability, but only at the later stage of actual enforcement. At the appeal before the referring court, Prism Investments submitted that the granting of the declaration of enforceability was manifestly contrary to public policy within the terms of Art 45, in conjunction with Art 34(1), in that the judgment at issue had lost its force through compliance in Belgium and that enforcement in the Netherlands could have no legal basis. The referring court found those arguments to be unfounded, but referred the question to the CJEU. After underlining the rationale behind the recognition and enforcement rules expressed in Recitals 16 and 17, the CJEU affirmed C 420/07 Apostolides that the grounds for revocation of the declaration of enforceability in Arts 34 and 35 are exhaustive and must be interpreted restrictively. It observed that compliance with the judgment in the MS of origin is not one of those grounds. Agreeing with AG Kokott, it also noted that the question whether or not the requirements of that financial settlement were fulfilled could require an extensive examination of the facts regarding the claim which would be difficult to reconcile with Brussels I’s objectives. It also agreed that compliance with a judicial decision does not deprive that decision of its enforceable nature, or lead to its being given legal effects that it would not have in the MS of origin, and that recognition concerns the specific characteristics of the judgment in question, without reference to the elements of fact and law in respect of compliance with the obligations arising from it. It held that Art 45 precludes the court with which an appeal is lodged under Art 43 or Article 44 from refusing or revoking a declaration of enforceability of a judgment on a ground other than those set out in Arts 34 and 35, such as compliance with that judgment in the MS of origin. The CJEU gave a very literalistic interpretation in this case which raises the questions whether it is consistent with the Brussels I’s objective to require the court to uphold a declaration of enforceability even though the judgment had been complied with in the MS of origin and could no longer be enforced there, and whether this serves procedural economy.