EUPillar T. v. Tachyon Europe BV - 49.440 - C. trav. Bruxelles, 21 November 2007

Summary

The employer is a company governed by Dutch law. The appellant, T., worked for this company as a sales representative for France and the Benelux from 15 March 2002, initially on a 1-year contract which was subsequently renewed for an undetermined period of time. According to the contract, the employee had to carry out his work “mainly in France and the Netherlands from his home in Belgium”. The employer installed a satellite communication device in T.’s home. The employer also reimbursed T.’s travel expenses. On 28 June 2002, Mr. T. received a letter from his employer to inform him that the contract would be terminated on 31 July 2002. His remaining salary and acquired vacation days would still be paid out, and Mr. T. would have to give back all company property. Thereby the parties waived their right to introduce any further claims. Mr. T. signed this letter. However, on 14 July 2003, Mr. T. introduced a claim for compensation in lieu of notice. According to Art. 19(2) Brussels I Regulation, “an employer may be sued in another Member State: (a) in the courts for the place where the employee habitually carries out his work or in the courts for the last place where he did so, or (b) if the employee does not or did not habitually carry out his work in any one country, in the courts for the place where the business which engaged the employee is or was situated.” Generally speaking, a sales representative habitually carries out his work at his domicile, since that is the “place where he has established the effective centre of his working activities.” (cf. ECJ, C-383/95, Rutten) It is there that the employee has an office where he organizes his activities for his employer and to which he returns after each business trip abroad. The contract also emphasised that Mr. T. carries out his work from his domicile. Mr. T. is domiciled in Hamme-Mille in Belgium, so that the Belgian courts have jurisdiction. As to the territorial jurisdiction of the court, Mr. T. could bring his claim before the courts of his domicile in the district of Nivelles on the basis of Art. 627, 9° Belgian Judicial Code. SHORT CRITIQUE The court correctly applies the Brussels I Regulation, however since it based jurisdiction on Article 19(2), it did not need to apply the Belgian Judicial Code to determine the territorial jurisdiction of the court. That article directly designates the courts for the place within a Member State that have jurisdiction.